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1Counterexample to the Generalized
Belfiore-Sole´ Secrecy Function Conjecture
for l-modular lattices
Anne-Maria Ernvall-Hyto¨nen and B. A. Sethuraman
Abstract
We show that the secrecy function conjecture that states that the maximum of the secrecy
function of an l-modular lattice occurs at 1/
√
l is false, by proving that the 4-modular lattice
C(4) = Z⊕√2Z⊕ 2Z fails to satisfy this conjecture. We also indicate how the secrecy function
must be modified in the l-modular case to have a more reasonable chance for it to have a
maximum at 1/
√
l, and show that the conjecture, modified with this new secrecy function, is
true for various 2-modular lattices.
Index Terms
Wiretap Coding, Secrecy Function, l-Modular Lattice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recall [13] that an integral lattice Λ ⊂ Rn is said to be l-modular if there exists a
similarity of Rn of norm l, that is, an orthogonal transformation S followed by a scaling
of lengths by
√
l, such that
√
lS(Λ∗) = Λ. Here, Λ∗ is the dual of Λ, and Λ ⊂ Λ∗ because of
integrality. It follows from elementary considerations that l must necessarily be an integer
and that Λ must have determinant ln/2. Since the determinant of Λ is an integer, we find
immediately that n must be even, unless l is itself a square. When l = 1, of course, an
l-modular lattice is known as a unimodular lattice.
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2The secrecy function was introduced in [8] by Oggier and Belfiore, who considered
the problem of wiretap code design for the Gaussian channel, using lattice-based coset
coding. The function was further refined by Belfiore and Sole´ in [1, Definition 3] to take
into account the volume of the lattice Λ. It is defined for an l-modular lattice Λ (actually
for any lattice) in dimension n by
Ξ(y) =
ΘλZn(y)
ΘΛ(y)
:=
ΘλZn(ıy)
ΘΛ(ıy)
. (1)
Here, y is a positive real variable, λ = ln/4 is the volume of the l-modular lattice Λ, λZn
denotes the cubic lattice Zn scaled to have the volume λ (thus, each dimension of λZn is
scaled by l1/4), and for any τ ∈ C with im(τ) > 0 and any lattice L, ΘL(τ) denotes the
theta series of L, that is, the series
∑∞
j=0 aje
ıpijτ , were aj is the number of vectors in L
of norm (squared length) j. As indicated in the equation above, when working exclusively
with purely imaginary values ıy of τ , we will simply write ΘL(y) for ΘL(ıy).
The secrecy function was studied in detail in [1] by Belfiore and Sole´. Assuming that the
noise variance σ2e on Eve’s channel is much higher than the corresponding variance σ
2
e on
Bob’s channel, they analyze the probability of both users making a correct decision, and
determine conditions under which Eve’s probability of correct decoding is minimized. If
Λe ⊂ Λb are the lattices used in the coset-coding paradigm, they express these conditions
in terms of the theta series of Λe. For a given choice of lattice Λe, it follows from these
considerations that the value of y at which the secrecy function ΞΛe(y) of Λe obtains
its maximum yields the value of the signal-to-noise ratio in Eve’s channel that causes
maximum confusion to Eve, as compared to using the standard lattice Zn. (The maximal
achievable value of the secrecy function is called the secrecy gain of the lattice Λe.)
Belfiore and Sole´ studied the secrecy function for various lattices and conjectured in [1]
that for a unimodular lattice (l = 1), the secrecy function assumes its (global) maximum
at y = 1. This has since been verified for a large number of lattices (see e.g., [5], [6],
[11], [12]), and it was proven in [11] that infinitely many unimodular lattices satisfy the
conjecture, but the full conjecture is still open. In [9], Oggier, Sole´ and Belfiore further
extended this conjecture to l-modular lattices (l > 1): they conjectured that the secrecy
function of l-modular lattices attains its (global) maximum at y = 1/
√
l ([9, Proposition
2, and Conjecture 1].
We show in this paper that this extended conjecture is false in general. We show that
the 4-modular lattice C(4) = Z⊕√2Z⊕ 2Z fails to satisfy the conjecture. We show that
in fact that the secrecy function of C(4) has a global minimum at y = 1/
√
4, and thus
behaves contrary to what is expected by the conjecture.
We also indicate how the conjecture must be modified to have a reasonable chance of
being true: the numerator in the secrecy function should be replaced by a suitable power
3of the theta series of D(l), where D(l) = Z ⊕ √lZ. We show that the modified secrecy
function conjecture holds for various 2-modular lattices, and in fact, provide a necessary
and sufficient criterion for a 2-modular lattice to satisfy the modified conjecture.
II. THE LATTICE C(4).
In this section we show that for the 4-modular lattice C(4) = Z ⊕ √2Z ⊕ 2Z, the
secrecy function of C(4) defined in Equation 1 attains a minimum at y = 1/2, showing
that the secrecy function conjecture is false in general. First note that C(4) is indeed 4-
modular: it is easy to see that its dual is the lattice Z ⊕ (1/√2)Z ⊕ (1/2)Z, and the
map R3 → R3 that sends (x, y, z) to (2z, 2y, 2x) indeed provides an isomorphism between
Z⊕(1/√2)Z⊕(1/2)Z and C(4), and this map is indeed a similarity that multiplies lengths
by 2 (and norms by 4).
Recall the Jacobi theta functions ϑ3(q), ϑ2(q) and ϑ4(q), where q = eıpiτ , im(τ) > 0.
We will interchangeably use the notation ϑ3(τ), ϑ2(τ) and ϑ4(τ) when thinking of these
as functions of τ instead of q, the usage will be clear from the context. These are given
by
ϑ2(q) = ϑ2(τ) =
∞∑
n=−∞
q(n+1/2)
2
= 2q1/4
∞∏
n=1
(1− q2n)(1 + q2n)2 (2)
ϑ3(q) = ϑ3(τ) =
∞∑
n=−∞
qn
2
=
∞∏
n=1
(1− q2n)(1 + q2n−1)2
ϑ4(q) = ϑ4(τ) =
∞∑
n=−∞
(−1)nqn2 =
∞∏
n=1
(1− q2n)(1− q2n−1)2.
These functions satisfy, for instance, the following formulas ([3, page 104]):
ϑ43(τ) = ϑ
4
2(τ) + ϑ
4
4(τ) (3)
2ϑ23(2τ) = ϑ
2
3(τ) + ϑ
2
4(τ)
2ϑ22(2τ) = ϑ
2
3(τ)− ϑ24(τ).
(Notice that the last two equations yield ϑ23(τ) = ϑ
2
3(2τ) + ϑ
2
2(2τ).)
In this paper we will be concerned with purely imaginary values of τ : τ = ıy where
y > 0. As with theta series of lattices, we will simply write ϑ3(y), ϑ2(y) and ϑ4(y)
for ϑ3(ıy), ϑ2(ıy) and ϑ4(ıy). The Jacobi theta functions ϑ2, ϑ3 and ϑ4 are useful in
representing the theta functions of various lattices. A thorough introduction to the theory
of these functions can be found in [16, Chap. 10], in terms of the “master” theta function
Θ(z|τ) = ∑∞n=−∞ e2piınz+piın2τ . (We may write our functions ϑ2, ϑ3, ϑ4 in terms of Θ
4as ϑ2(τ) = eıpiτ/4Θ(
τ
2
|τ), ϑ3(τ) = Θ(0|τ), and ϑ4(τ) = Θ(1
2
|τ)–see [3, page 102] for
instance, but note the slight difference in the definitions of Θ in [16] and [3].)
Note that the theta series of C(4) (for τ = ıy, y > 0) is given by ϑ3(y)ϑ3(2y)ϑ3(4y),
and the theta series of (
√
2Z)3 is given by ϑ3(2y)3. We find it convenient to work with
the reciprocal of the secrecy function:
1/ΞC(4)(y) =
ϑ3(y)ϑ3(2y)ϑ3(4y)
ϑ33(2y)
=
ϑ3(y)ϑ3(4y)
ϑ23(2y)
. (4)
We find it convenient as well to put z = 2y. Thus, to show that the secrecy function of C(4)
defined in Equation 1 attains a minimum at y = 1/2, we need to show that the modified
function
f(y) =
ϑ3(y/2)ϑ3(2y)
ϑ23(y)
(5)
(where by abuse of notation we have retained the symbol y for the new variable z) has a
maximum at y = 1.
We now invoke results connecting theta functions at the purely imaginary values τ = ıy
(y > 0) and τ/2 (i.e., at q = e−piy and
√
q) from [2]; a summary of what we need is in
[2, Section 4.6, Page 137]. We build on the notation “k” and “l” of [2] and write more
specifically k(q), k′(q), l(q), and l′(q) for the objects:
k(q) =
ϑ22(q)
ϑ23(q)
(6)
k′(q) =
√
1− k2(q) = ϑ
2
4(q)
ϑ23(q)
l(q) = k(
√
q) =
ϑ22(
√
q)
ϑ23(
√
q)
l′(q) = k′(
√
q) =
ϑ24(
√
q)
ϑ23(
√
q)
(The expression for k′(q) arises from the first of Equations 3 above.) Finally, we write
M2(q) =
ϑ23(q)
ϑ23(
√
q)
. (7)
As described in [2], M2(q) can be written in terms of k(q), k′(q), l(q), and l′(q), and
further, k(q) and l(q) are connected by a “modular equation.” We have the relations ([2,
Section 4.6, Page 137] (these can also be directly derived from the properties of theta
functions in Equations 3)
M2(q) =
1
1 + k(q)
=
1 + l′(q)
2
, (8)
5and
l(q) =
2
√
k(q)
1 + k(q)
(9)
k(q) =
1− l′(q)
1 + l′(q)
Since f(y) =
M2(q
2)
M2(q)
, Equations 8 shows that
f(y) =
1 + k(q)
1 + k(q2)
=
(1 + k(q))(1 + l′(q2))
2
=
(1 + k(q))(1 + k′(q))
2
. (10)
Thus, we need to maximize (1 + k(q))(1 + k′(q)) where k(q)2 + k′(q)2 = 1. Putting
k(q) = cos(α) =
1− t2
1 + t2
and k′(q) = sin(α) =
2t
1 + t2
, where t = tan(α/2), we find need
to determine the extrema of
f(t) =
(1 + t)2
(1 + t2)2
. (11)
Now 0 < k(q) < 1 and 0 < k′(q) < 1 by definition of k(q), k′(q) and the relation
k(q)2 + k′(q)2 = 1. Thus, 0 < α < pi/2, so 0 < α/2 < pi/4. It follows that 0 < t < 1.
Calculus now shows that that t =
√
2 − 1 is the unique (and hence global) maximum of
f(t) in the region 0 < t < 1.
Corresponding to t =
√
2 − 1, we find α/2 = pi/8, i.e., α = pi/4. Thus, q is such that
k(q) = k′(q), i.e., ϑ2(y) = ϑ4(y). This occurs precisely at y = 1 (see for instance [12,
Proof of Lemma 1], or [2, Exercise 4, Section 2.3] along with [2, Exercise 8b, Section
3.1]). Further, we see that f(y) considered as a function of y has the same increase/decrease
behavior on either side of y = 1 as f(t) does on either side of t =
√
2−1 when considered
as a function of t: The map y 7→ k(e−piy) is a monotonically decreasing map ([2, Equation
2.3.9, Page 42], this also follows from Lemma 1 ahead, and the fact that k2+k′2 = 1), while
the map k(e−piy) = cos(α) 7→ t = tan(α/2) is also monotonically decreasing. The chain
rule now shows that df/dy and df/dt have the same sign. It follows that f(y) increases
for 0 < y < 1 and decreases for 1 < y <∞; correspondingly, since 1/ΞC(4)(y) = f(2y),
we find ΞC(4) decreases for 0 < y < 1/2 and increases for 1/2 < y <∞.
Thus, C(4) violates the conjecture.
Remark 1. The graph of the secrecy function of C(4) may be computed (approximately),
using Mathematicar. The graph is shown in Figure 1, and verifies our analysis above.
6Fig. 1. Graph of secrecy function of lattice C(4). Notice that according to the original conjecture, the
function should have its maximum at x = 12 , but it has a minimum.
III. MODIFIED SECRECY FUNCTION
The current definition of the secrecy function compares the theta series of an l-modular
lattice in Rn to the theta series of the (scaled) unimodular lattice Zn. A more natural
definition would be one that compared likes with likes: that compared the theta series of
an l-modular lattice to that of another reference l-modular lattice, scaled suitably to match
volumes.
The simplest l-modular lattice is D(l) = Z⊕√lZ (when l = 1, we take D(l) = Z). Note
that D(l) can be proved to be l-modular exactly like the lattice C(4) in Section II—the
dual is the lattice Z⊕ (1/√l)Z, and the required map on R2 is the one that takes (x, y) to
(
√
ly,
√
lx). Accordingly, we write n = k dim(D(l)) (= 2k for l > 1), and for an l-modular
lattice Λ in Rn, we define the l-modular secrecy function Ξl(y) (or Ξl,Λ(y) if the lattice
Λ needs to be emphasized), by
Ξl(y) = Ξl,Λ(y) :=
ΘD(l)(y)
k
ΘΛ(y)
, y > 0. (12)
(Note that when l = 1, k = n, D(l) = Z, and this definition reduces to the earlier definition
of the secrecy function of a unimodular lattice.)
7When l is not a square, n must necessarily be even, as we have noted in Section I.
When l is a square, n need not be even, as the example of C(4) attests. In such cases, the
definition above of the secrecy function involves a square root of the theta series of D(l).
(Of course, we are scaling up the theta series, not the lattice!)
It is reasonable now to modify the original conjecture and make the following l-modular
secrecy function conjecture: that for all l-modular lattices, the l-modular secrecy function
attains its (global) maximum at 1/
√
l. We show in the next section that this new conjecture
holds for various 2-modular lattices in small dimension. But we can see immediately that
it holds for C(4) as follows:
Ξl(y) = Ξl,C(4)(y) =
(ϑ3(y)ϑ3(4y))
3/2
ϑ3(y)ϑ3(2y)ϑ3(4y)
=
(ϑ3(y)ϑ3(4y))
1/2
ϑ3(2y)
. (13)
But we have already seen above in Section II that Ξl(y)2 =
ϑ3(y)ϑ3(4y)
ϑ23(2y)
has a global
maximum at y = 1/2, so Ξl(y) also has a global maximum at y = 1/2. Thus, our
modified conjecture is true for C(4).
Remark 2. The l-modular secrecy function exhibits “multiplicative symmetry” about the
point 1/
√
l, that is, Ξl(a) = Ξl(b) when ab = 1/l. The proof is the same as that for the
originally defined secrecy function, [9, Prop. 2].
IV. 2-MODULAR LATTICES
In the following, we will show that the l-modular secrecy function conjecture stated
above holds for all the 2-modular lattices considered in [7]. The starting point is the
following description of the theta series of such a lattice:
Theorem 1. The theta series of a 2-modular lattice Λ in dimension n = 2k is a polynomial
ΘΛ(y) = f1(y)
k
bk/2c∑
i=0
aif2(y)
i
 = bk/2c∑
i=0
aif
k−2i
1 ∆4(y)
i, (14)
where f1(y) = ΘC(2)(y), f2(y) =
ϑ22(2y)ϑ
2
4(y)
4ϑ23(y)ϑ
2
3(2y)
, and ∆4 = f 21 f2.
This theorem follows from a more general theorem of Rains and Sloane ([14, Theorem
9, Corollary 3]. Although it is only applied to odd 2-modular lattices in [7, Eqns 29, 30],
the theorem above actually holds for any 2-modular lattice. We can see this as follows:
the theorem and corollary referred to in [14] apply to strongly l-modular lattices that are
rationally equivalent to (C(l))k (where n = 2k). The definition of strongly modularity in
[14] (see the discussion in that paper, following Theorem 6) shows that when l is prime, any
8l-modular lattice is automatically strongly l-modular. We thus need the following theorem
to enable us to apply the results of [14, Theorem 9, Corollary 3] to any 2-modular lattice:
Theorem 2. All 2-modular lattices in Rn (n = 2k) are rationally equivalent to (C(2))k.
Proof: This is well known, and falls out easily from the classification theorem for
quadratic forms over Q. For lack of a specific reference, we sketch the proof in Appendix
A.
For us, since 2 is prime, C(2) is the same as D(2), we find
Ξ2,Λ(y) = Ξ2(y) =
bk/2c∑
i=0
aif2(y)
i
−1 . (15)
We will study the general behavior of such a polynomial function of f2 and then apply
our results to the specific theta series computed in [7].
We have, using Equations 3:
f2(y) =
ϑ22(2y)ϑ
2
4(y)
4ϑ23(y)ϑ
2
3(2y)
=
(ϑ23(y)− ϑ24(y))ϑ24(y)
4(ϑ23(y) + ϑ
2
4(y))ϑ
2
3(y)
=
(1− α)α
4(1 + α)
, (16)
where α = α(y) =
ϑ24
ϑ23
(y).
Lemma 1. The function
ϑ4
ϑ3
(y) is strictly increasing for (positive) real y, and as y → 0,
the function approaches 0, and as y →∞, the function approaches 1.
Proof: A formal proof that takes care of intricacies of infinite products and in-
terchanges of limits is in Appendix B. The intuition is as follows: Using the product
representations of ϑ4 and ϑ3 in Equations 2, we have
ϑ4
ϑ3
(y) =
∏∞
m=1(1− q2m)(1− q2m−1)2∏∞
m=1(1− q2m)(1 + q2m−1)2
=
∞∏
m=1
(
1− q2m−1
1 + q2m−1
)2
=
∞∏
m=1
(
2
1 + q2m−1
− 1
)2
=
∞∏
m=1
(
2
1 + q2m−1
− 1
)2
.
Now, as y increases, q decreases, and hence,
(
2
1+q2m−1 − 1
)
increases. This shows that
the function is increasing. Furthermore, as y → 0, q2m−1 → 1, and
(
2
1+q2m−1 − 1
)
→ 0.
As y →∞, q2m−1 → 0, and
(
2
1+q2m−1 − 1
)
→ 1.
9Lemma 2. The function
f(x) =
(1− x)x
(1 + x)
has a unique maximum in the open interval (0, 1), and this maximum is met at the point
x =
√
2− 1.
Proof: This is straightforward.
Remark 3. The value of f2 when α =
√
2− 1 is (1− (
√
2− 1))(√2− 1)
4(1 +
√
2− 1) ≈ 0.0429. We
will denote this value by β in what follows.
Lemma 3. The quantity
ϑ24
ϑ23
(y) takes on the value
√
2− 1 precisely when y = 1/√2.
Proof: This is in Appendix C
We now use the previous results to prove the following:
Proposition 4. A necessary and sufficient condition for Ξ2(y) to have a global maximum
at y = 1/
√
2 is that the polynomial (Ξ2(f2))
−1 =
(∑bk/2c
i=0 aif2(y)
i
)
in the variable f2
(Equation 15), restricted to the domain 0 < f2 ≤ β where β as in Remark 3 above, have
a global minimum at f2 = β.
Proof: By Equation 16, f2(y) =
(1− α)α
4(1 + α)
, where α = α(y) =
ϑ24
ϑ23
(y), so by Lemma
2, f2(α) has a unique maximum when α =
√
2 − 1. By Remark 3 this maximum is β.
Moreover, by Lemma 3, α =
√
2 − 1 precisely when y = 1/√2. Thus, for other values
of y, f2(y) < β, and of course, f2(y) > 0 by the definition of f2 and by the fact that
α ∈ (0, 1). We thus find that as y ranges in (0,∞), f2(y) ranges in (0, β], and f2(y) = β
precisely when y = 1/
√
2. It is now clear that Ξ2(y), with 0 < y < ∞, attains its global
maximum when y = 1/
√
2 if and only if (Ξ2(y))
−1, with 0 < y < ∞, attains its global
minimum when y = 1/
√
2 if and only if (Ξ2(f2))
−1, with f2 ∈ (0, β], attains its global
minimum at f2 = β.
Corollary 5. If the polynomial (Ξ2(f2))−1 is decreasing in (0, β], then Ξ2 has a global
maximum at y = 1/
√
2.
We now consider the odd 2-modular lattices in [7, Table 2]. The authors have computed
their theta series in terms of f2 and ∆4 = f 21 f2. Factoring f
n/2
1 from these series (where n is
the ambient dimension), we have the following table, where the third column contains the
10
derivative of the polynomial (Ξ2(f2))
−1, and the fourth column checks that this derivative
is negative in (0, β], i.e, (Corollary 5) that (Ξ2(f2))
−1 is decreasing in (0, β]:
Dim (Ξ2(f2))
−1 d/df2 (Ξ2(f2))
−1 Neg in (0, β]?
8 1− 8f2 −8 Yes
12 1− 12f2 −12 Yes
16 1− 16f2 −16 Yes
18 1− 18f2 + 18f 22 −18 + 36f2 Yes
20 1− 20f2 + 40f 22 −20 + 80f2 Yes
22 1− 22f2 + 66f
2
2
−4f 32 −22 + 132f2 − 12f
2
2 Yes
24 1− 24f2 + 96f
2
2
−28f 32 −24 + 192f2 − 84f
2
2 Yes
26 1− 26f2 + 130f
2
2
−80f 32 −26 + 260f2 − 240f
2
2 Yes
28 1− 28f2 + 168f
2
2
−176f 32 + 32f 42
−28 + 336f2 − 528f 22
+128f 32
Yes
30 1− 30f2 + 210f
2
2
−282f 32 + 112f 42
−30 + 420f2 − 846f 22
+448f 32
Yes
Clearly, the modified conjecture holds for these lattices.
For illustration, we graph the l-modular secrecy function for the odd 2-modular lattice
in dimension 22 considered above in Figure IV.
We turn our attention now to the even 2-modular lattices considered in [7, Table 1].
There are three of them: D4, BW16, HS20. There, their theta series have been developed
in terms of two functions: the theta series of D4 itself (this is a tautological statement for
D4 of course!), and ∆16:
ΘBW16 = Θ
4
D4
− 96∆16 and ΘHS20 = Θ5D4 − 120ΘD4∆16.
By Theorem 1, these theta series can be also expressed as polynomials in ΘC(2) and ∆4.
By comparing coefficients, we have
ΘD4 = Θ
2
C(2) − 4∆4
ΘBW16 = Θ
8
C(2) − 16∆4Θ6C(2) − 256∆34Θ2C(2) + 256∆44
ΘHS20 = Θ
10
C(2) − 20Θ8C(2)∆4 + 40Θ6C(2)∆24 − 160Θ4C(2)∆34 + 1280Θ2C(2)∆44 − 1024∆54.
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Fig. 2. Graph of the l-modular secrecy function of the odd 2-modular 22-dimensional lattice considered in [7, Table
2]. It has its maximum at x = 1√
2
.
Since ΘC(2) = f1 and ∆4 = f 21 f2, the 2-modular secrecy functions Ξ2 are
Ξ2,D4 = (1− 4f2)−1
Ξ2,BW16 = (1− 16f2 − 256f 32 + 256f 42 )−1
Ξ2,HS20 = (1− 20f2 + 40f 22 − 160f 32 + 1280f 42 − 1024f 52 )−1.
The function (1 − 4f2)−1 is clearly increasing in the range of f2. As for Ξ2,BW16 , the
derivative of the denominator is
−16− 768f 22 + 1024f 32 ,
which has its only real zero at f2 ≈ 0.78, and therefore, the denominator is decreasing and
the function increasing in [0, β]. Finally, the derivative of the denominator of the 2-modular
secrecy function of HS20 is
−20 + 80f2 − 480f 22 + 5120f 32 − 5120f 42 .
The first positive real zero is at f2 ≈ 0.17, and therefore the denominator is decreasing
and the function increasing in [0, β].
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APPENDIX A
2-MODULAR LATTICES ARE RATIONALLY EQUIVALENT TO DIRECT SUM OF COPIES OF
C(2).
We sketch here the proof of Theorem 2. We assume basic familiarity with quadratic
forms. The proof invokes the local-global theory of quadratic forms over number fields;
we only sketch the outlines of the theory and only provide as much detail as would enable
one to construct the full proof for oneself. An excellent reference is [15]. A very readable
account is also in [10].
We recall first the setup behind rational equivalence: Any symmetric n × n matrix A
with entries in Q (such as the Gram matrix GL of an integral lattice L in Rn, whose
entries are even in Z) determines a quadratic form q on Qn in the standard way: if ei are
the standard basis vectors, then q(x1e1 + · · · + xnen) = vtAv, where v = (x1, . . . , xn)t;
here the superscript t stands for transpose. Conversely, given a quadratic form q on Qn,
we obtain a symmetric n × n matrix A with rational entries, with (i, j) entry given by
(q(ei+ej)−q(ei)−q(ej))/2, . We say two quadratic forms q1 and q2 on Qn are equivalent
over Q, or rationally equivalent, if there exists an invertible n × n matrix with rational
entries S such that StA1S = A2, where Ai is the symmetric matrix associated with qi
as above. Alternatively, two such quadratic forms are rationally equivalent if one! can be
obtained from the other by a linear change of variables defined over Q. (These definitions
extend in the obvious way to quadratic forms over any field of characteristic different
from 2.) We apply these considerations to lattices: two integral lattices L1 and L2 are said
to be rationally equivalent if their associated quadratic forms are rationally equivalent, or
equivalently, if the Gram matrices G1 and G2 of the two lattices are related by StG1S = G2
for some invertible n× n matrix S with rational entries.
There is a well-established theory that determines when two quadratic forms defined
over Q are equivalent. By this theory, the rational equivalence class of a quadratic form on
Qn which is non degenerate, that is, the determinant of the associated symmetric matrix
is nonzero, is determined by the following objects: the discriminant, the signature, and
the Hasse-Witt invariant at each (integer) prime p. The first two are easy to describe. The
discriminant of a non degenerate quadratic form defined over Q is just the class of the
determinant of the associated symmetric matrix in Q∗/Q∗2. As for the signature recall
first that given any symmetric n × n matrix A with entries in a field k of characteristic
different from 2, there exists a nonsingular n×n matrix S such that StAS is diagonal. The
signature of a non degenerate quadratic form on Qn is just the number of positive entries
minus the number of negative entries in any diagonal representation of the quadratic form,
thought of as a quadratic form on Rn. (The definition is independent of which diagonal
representation is used.) In our situation, note that the quadratic forms arising from the
2-modular lattice L and from (C(2))k are both positive definite, since they yield lengths of
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vectors in Euclidean space. It follows that all diagonalizations of either quadratic form must
consist only of positive elements along the diagonal. Thus, the signature is the same for
both lattices. Further, both lattices clearly have the same determinant for their associated
quadratic form, namely 2k. Thus, to prove the rational equivalence of L and (C(2))k,
we only need to consider their Hasse-Witt invariants, and to show that their Hasse-Witt
invariants are the same at each prime p.
In fact, the Hasse-Witt invariant is defined not only for each integer prime p, but also,
for R. (It is traditional to think of R as the completion of Q at the “infinite prime.”) In what
follows, v will denote either an integer prime p or ∞, and Qv will accordingly denoted
either the field Qp of p-adic rationals (when v = p) or R (when v = ∞). Given a non
degenerate quadratic form q over the field Qv, one first takes a diagonal representation
diag(a1, . . . , an) of the associated symmetric matrix. The Hasse-Witt invariant v(q) is
defined to be the product of the Hilbert symbols (ai, aj)v over all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n). (The
definition is independent of which diagonal representation is used.) In turn, given a and
b in Q∗v, the Hilbert symbol (a, b)v is defined to be 1 if the equation z2 − ax2 − by2 has
a solution (x, y, z) 6= (0, 0, 0) in Qv, and −1 otherwise. A few relevant facts about the
Hasse-Witt invariant and the Hilbert symbol are the following:
1) The Hasse-Witt invariant of a quadratic form q defined over Qn is 1 at all but at
most a finite number of primes v. (Here, for each prime v, we first view q as a
quadratic form over Qnv and then calculate v(q).)
2) For a quadratic form q defined over Qn, the product over all primes v of v(q) is 1.
3) For an odd (integer) prime p, given a and b in Q∗p, the Hilbert symbol (a, b)p is
defined as follows: we first write a = pαu and b = pβv, where u and v are units of
Zp. Then
(a, b) = (−1)αβ(p−1)/2
(
u
p
)β (
v
p
)α
, (17)
where
(
u
p
)
is the Legendre symbol defined to be 1 if the class of u in Fp is a square
and −1 otherwise.
It follows from the characterization above that if p is odd and a and b are themselves
units in Qp (by units in Qp we mean that α and β above are both zero, so these are the
units of Zp), then the Hilbert symbol (a, b)p is 1. Also, the Hilbert Symbol (a, b)∞ is 1
whenever both a and b are positive, since z2 = ax2 + by2 will clearly have a nontrivial
solution, e.g., (1, 0,
√
a), or (0, 1,
√
b). (In fact, it is enough that just one of a or b is
positive.) Now apply these considerations to the lattice (C(2))k: the associated quadratic
form q(C(2))k is already diagonal, with k 1s and k 2s along the diagonal. For any odd prime
p, 1 and 2 are both units, and therefore, p(q(C(2))k) = 1. It is clear too that ∞(q(C(2))k) = 1
since 1 and 2 are positive. It follows from (2) above that 2(q(C(2))k) = 1 as well.
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We now consider v(qL) at each integer prime and at infinity, where qL is the quadratic
form associated to the 2-regular lattice L. As already noted, since qL is positive definite,
any diagonalization over R must consist of all positive numbers along the diagonal. Thus,
∞(qL) = 1. It is enough now to show that for any odd prime p, p(qL) = 1, for then, by
(2) above, 2(qL) will be 1 as well. The key is the following proposition that describes a
diagonalization. Recall that Z(p) denotes the localization of Z at p, that is, the ring of all
reduced fractions a/b such that p does not divide b; Z(p) is a unique factorization domain
with a single prime, namely p, and the reduced fraction a/b above of Z(p) is divisible by p
precisely when a is divisible by p. Under the embedding Q 7→ Qp, Z(p) goes to the p-adic
integers Zp, and the elements of Z(p) not divisible by p live naturally as units in the p-adic
integers Zp.
Proposition 6. Suppose that A is a symmetric matrix in Mn(Q) and suppose that p does
not divide the determinant of A, where p is an odd prime. Then, there exists an n × n
matrix S with entries in Z(p) of determinant ±1 such that StAS = diag(a1, . . . , an), where
the numerators and denominators of each ai, when written as a reduced fraction, is not
divisible by p.
(For the full statement of the proposition, see [10, Lemma 5.1].)
Proof: We sketch the proof here. Since p does not divide the determinant, some entry
ai,j of A must be prime to p. First suppose that some ai,i is prime to p. Then, we swap the
basis vectors e1 and ei, a transformation of determinant −1, to ensure that a1,1 is prime
to p. If all ai,i are divisible by p, some ai,j with i 6= j must be prime to p. We consider
(ei + ej)
tA(ei + ej): this is ai,i + aj,j + 2ai,j . Since each ai,i and aj,j are divisible by p
and since p is odd and ai,j is prime to p, we find (ei + ej)tA(ei + ej) is prime to p. Thus,
the transformation e1 7→ (ei + ej), ei 7→ e1 is of determinant −1, and ensures that a1,1 is
prime to p. Thus by a change of basis with determinant −1, we can ensure that a1,1 is
prime to p. We now write A in the block form
A =
(
a1,1 B
Bt C
)
,
and take S to be the matrix (
1 −a−11,1B
0 In−1
)
to find
StAS =
(
a1,1 0
0 C − a−11,1BtB
)
.
(Notice that S has determinant 1.) We now proceed by induction, working in Z(p), noting
that the product of the various basis-change matrices at each stage has determinant ±1. .
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Since the determinant of the matrix associated to qL is 2k, we may apply this result to
qL. For a given odd prime p, take a diagonal representation diag(a1, . . . , an) of qL over
Qp as furnished by the proposition. Each ai is nonzero element of Z(p) not divisible by p,
and is therefore a unit in Qp. Thus, by (17) above, the Hasse-Witt invariant p(qL) is 1.
By (2) above, 2(qL) is also 1.
Since L and (C(2))k have the same Hasse-Witt invariant at every prime in addition
to having the same signature and discriminant, they are indeed rationally equivalent as
claimed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: We use the product representations of the theta functions. Writing q = e−piy
as usual, so 0 < q < 1, we have
ϑ4(y) =
∞∏
m=1
(1− q2m)(1− q2m−1)2
ϑ3(y) =
∞∏
m=1
(1− q2m)(1 + q2m−1)2
Since the partial products PN =
∏N
m=1(1− q2m)(1− q2m−1)2 and QN =
∏N
m=1(1− q2m)(1 + q2m−1)2
converge to ϑ4(y) and ϑ3(y) respectively, and since QN is clearly not zero for 0 < q < 1,
the quotient PN/QN converges to
ϑ4
ϑ3
(y), and we have
ϑ4
ϑ3
(y) = lim
N→∞
∏N
m=1(1− q2m)(1− q2m−1)2∏N
m=1(1− q2m)(1 + q2m−1)2
= lim
N→∞
N∏
m=1
(
1− q2m−1
1 + q2m−1
)2
= lim
N→∞
N∏
m=1
(
2
1 + q2m−1
− 1
)2
=
∞∏
m=1
(
2
1 + q2m−1
− 1
)2
.
Note that since 0 < q < 1,
0 <
(
2
1 + q2m−1
− 1
)2
< 1.
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As y increases, q strictly decreases, and
(
2
1 + q2m−1
− 1
)
strictly increases. Hence, if
y > y′, then the partial products (note that these start from 2)
RN(y) =
N∏
m=2
(
2
1 + q2m−1
− 1
)2
satisfy PN(y) > PN(y′). It follows that limN→∞RN(y) ≥ limN→∞RN(y′). Note that
limN→∞RN(y) 6= 0 for any y with 0 < y < 1 since ϑ4(y) and ϑ3(y) and hence ϑ4
ϑ3
(y) are
nonzero for any y with 0 < y < 1. Writing q′ for e−piy′ , we have for m = 1 that(
2
1 + q
− 1
)2
>
(
2
1 + q′
− 1
)2
.
Hence we find
ϑ4
ϑ3
(y) =
(
2
1 + q
− 1
)2 ∞∏
m=2
(
2
1 + q2m−1
− 1
)2
>
(
2
1 + q′
− 1
)2 ∞∏
m=2
(
2
1 + q′2m−1
− 1
)2
=
ϑ4
ϑ3
(y′).
Hence,
ϑ4
ϑ3
(y) is a strictly increasing function of y.
As for the limits as y tends to 0 or ∞, note that y → 0 precisely when q → 1, and
y →∞ precisely when q → 0. Now
ϑ4
ϑ3
(y) =
(
2
1 + q
− 1
)2 ∞∏
m=2
(
2
1 + q2m−1
− 1
)2
≤
(
2
1 + q
− 1
)2
,
and of course
(
2
1 + q
− 1
)2
→ 0 as q → 1, i.e., when y → 0.
Let us now consider the case y →∞, i.e. q → 0. Since ϑ4(q) is absolutely convergent
for 0 < q < 1, we can group the terms in the following way:
ϑ4(q) = 1− 2q + 2(q4 − q9) + 2(q16 − q25) + · · · > 1− 2q,
since qn > qm when n < m.
On the other hand q4 − q9 < q4 < q; q16 − q25 < q16 < q2, etc., so
ϑ4(q) < 1− 2q + 2(q + q2 + · · · ) = 1− 2q + 2q
1− q .
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Hence, 1− 2q < ϑ4(q) < 1− 2q + 2q1−q . Now, as q → 0, the two terms on either side of
ϑ4(q) tend to 1, so ϑ4(q) also tends to 1.
We argue similarly for ϑ3(q): 1 < ϑ3(q) < 1 + 2(q + q2 + q3 + · · · ), where we have
used q4 < q2, q9 < q3, q16 < q4, etc. Thus, we find 1 < ϑ3(q) < 1 + 2q1−q . Taking limits as
q → 0, we find ϑ3(q) tends to 1.
Thus, as q → 0, ϑ4(q) and ϑ3(q) each tend to 1, so their quotient tends to 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof: By [2, Theorem 2.3], for k =
ϑ22(q)
ϑ23(q)
,
pi
K ′(k)
K(k)
= − log q. (18)
Here,
K(k) =
∫ 1
0
dt
(1− t2)(1− k2t2)
and K ′(k) = K(k′), where k′ =
√
1− k2. By [2, Exercise 4, §1.6],
K ′
K
(
√
2− 1) =
√
2. (19)
In fact, we can see this as follows: Denoting
√
2 − 1 temporarily by α, we have α′ =√
1− α2 = √2α. By [2, Theorem 1.2 (a), §1.4],
K(α) =
1
1 + α
K
(
2
√
α
1 + α
)
.
For our choice of α,
2
√
α
1 + α
is just α′, so the relation above becomes K(α) =
1
1 + α
K ′(α),
which yields Equation 19 above.
Now, since k′ =
ϑ24(q)
ϑ23(q)
, we have in our situation k′ =
√
2− 1, hence, for k = √1− k′2,
the expression
K ′(k)
K(k)
on the left side of Equation 18 equals
K(k′)
K ′(k′)
=
K
K ′
(
√
2−1) = 1/√2.
Hence, from Equation 18 and the fact that q = e−piy, we find pi(1/
√
2) = piy, so y = 1/
√
2.
Moroever, by Lemma 1 above, this is the unique value of y for which
ϑ24
ϑ23
(y) attains this
value.
We note that theta functions have been computed for special values of y, some of which
can be found in [4] for instance.
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